What can the crisis of U.S. capitalism in the 1970s teach us about the current crisis and its possible outcomes?

By Alejandro Reuss

This article is from the November/December 2009 issue of Dollars & Sense magazine.

 

A capitalist economy is like a very complex machine. It involves millions of individuals and capitalist firms, all making decisions that are not deliberately coordinated beforehand. The many gears of this machine do not automatically mesh. When some people decide to save part of their incomes, it does not automatically mean that they will find others who want to borrow and invest. When some people decide to invest, it does not automatically mean that they will find buyers for the goods produced as a result. Whether the gears of a capitalist economy mesh or not depends on the institutional framework in which capitalist companies operate. If the institutional framework does not work, and the gears do not mesh, the result is a crisis.

Radical political economists in the United States have termed the whole set of conditions and institutions that shape the process of capitalist profit-making, in a particular society at a particular time, a “social structure of accumulation.” Capital accumulation, the process of capitalist companies making profits and re-investing them to expand their operations, is essential to capitalist economies. Capitalist firms that cannot turn a profit will not have an incentive to invest. If capitalist companies do not invest, factories will be shuttered and workers unemployed. Capitalist economies always go through boom-and-bust cycles, with recessions interrupting the process of capital accumulation and economic growth. Most of the time, these crises are shallow enough that “normal” economic growth resumes without major changes in framework institutions. However, severe crises, exposing serious defects in the existing “social structure of accumulation,” may result in the overturning of the old framework and the establishment of a new one.

The most severe crises may actually threaten not only the established framework, but even the continued existence of the capitalist system itself. In the last century, there have been three periods of profound crisis in the framework institutions of U.S. capitalism: the Great Depression of the 1930s, the crisis of the 1970s, and the current crisis. Of these three, the Depression was the most profound, though it did not come close to threatening the capitalist system in the United States (it came much closer in other capitalist countries). Both the Depression and the crisis of the 1970s, however, resulted in major changes in the framework institutions of U.S. capitalism. The Depression ushered in an era in which the framework included a relatively large government role and powerful unions in the most important industries. This is sometimes known as the period of “regulated capitalism.” The crisis of the 1970s ended this era and ushered in another, characterized by a new framework in which the government role diminished and unions were gravely weakened. This is sometimes known as the era of “neoliberal capitalism.”

A retrospective look at the crisis of the 1970s—as a pivot between two different eras in the history of U.S. capitalism—is not just an exercise in nostalgia. Rather, it is an opportunity to try to extract lessons from the history of U.S. capitalism, including this and other crises, to apply to the current crisis and its possible outcomes.

The “Golden Age” of U.S. Capitalism

Mainstream (“neoclassical”) economists often act as if capitalist economies operate according to unchanging universal laws, and that any violation of these “laws of the market” (such as government macroeconomic intervention, industrial regulation, social welfare spending, unions, etc.) inevitably spells disaster. The performance of the U.S. economy during the so-called “Golden Age,” from the late 1940s to the early 1970s, belies this view.

Our first key lesson: Capitalist economies can operate under a wide variety of institutional frameworks that foster capital accumulation and economic growth.

By most conventional measures, the U.S. economy performed better during the “Golden Age” than during comparable periods in U.S. history, combining high rates of economic growth along with low rates of unemployment and inflation. From the late 1940s to the early 1970s, the U.S. economy grew at an average annual rate of nearly 4%. The annual unemployment rate only exceeded 6% twice in the 25 years between 1949 and 1973. The annual inflation rate, too, only topped 6% twice, and was actually under 2% for 14 of the 25 years in this period. The real average hourly earnings of production workers increased at an average rate of over 2% per year.

During this period, the U.S. economy was less characterized by the “free market” policies favored by today’s mainstream economists than during the periods before or since. A much broader consensus existed among economists and policymakers of the need for government intervention to stabilize the overall economy, prevent recessions, and maintain full employment. Government spending on consumption and investment (which excludes transfers) was somewhat higher (generally 21-23% of GDP) from the late 1950s to the early 1970s than it has been since (generally less than 21%, and less than 19% between the early 1990s and the current recession). Several major business sectors, including transportation, communications, utilities, and, most importantly, banking and insurance, were highly regulated. The regulation of the financial sector, in particular, was a response to the Depression and an attempt to reduce the financial instability that had helped precipitate it. Unions had a much larger and more secure place in the U.S. economy. The unionization rate peaked at over one-fourth of the labor force in the mid 1950s, and remained over 20% into the mid 1970s (for nonagricultural workers, it peaked at nearly 35% and remained over 25% into the mid 1970s).

The radical economists Samuel Bowles, David Gordon, and Thomas Weisskopf, in their influential book Beyond the Waste Land, identified three key pillars of the postwar social structure of accumulation, which they termed the “limited capital-labor accord,” the “capitalist-citizen accord,” and the “Pax Americana.”

The limited capital-labor accord included the willingness of large employers to recognize unions and bargain collectively, and the unions’ acceptance of management control over the production process in exchange for wage increases tied to productivity growth, health and retirement benefits, and job security. Radical economists speak of a limited capital-labor accord since these arrangements excluded the majority of U.S. workers, who were not employed by large companies in the “core” industries (auto, steel, trucking, etc.). In addition, the idea of the accord should not be interpreted to mean that industrial conflict ended. Even in the core industries, employers only grudgingly accepted unions and, unable to destroy them by frontal assault, adopted strategies akin to low-intensity warfare.

Richard Nixon bowling at the White House Lanes. (Photo credit: The Ollie Atkins Collection, Special Collections & Archives, George Mason University Libraries.)
Nixon responded to the threat of inflation with unprecedented peacetime wage and price controls.

The capitalist-citizen accord included the government commitment to preventing mass unemployment and the establishment of the social welfare state. These were responses to the Great Depression and the upsurge in social protest during the 1930s, and helped moderate the levels of social protest in the late 1940s and 1950s. Again, the idea of an “accord” requires serious qualification. In the era before the main advances of the Civil Rights and women’s liberation movements, most of the U.S. population was excluded from any accord. These grievances would give rise to the explosive social protests of the 1960s.

The “Pax Americana” refers to the dominant position of the United States in the capitalist world. In the early postwar period, the leading U.S. companies had little to fear from international competitors, then only beginning to emerge from the ruin of the Second World War. U.S. political and military power, meanwhile, helped secure sources of cheap raw materials and energy. The U.S. government propped up friendly dictators whom it could count on to “fight communism,” maintain the security of U.S. companies’ investments, and quash efforts at labor organization. When this strategy failed, as when socialist or nationalist governments came to power and threatened U.S. companies’ property or access to cheap labor, the U.S. government engineered coups or intervened militarily.

Capitalists found plenty to complain about in the postwar social structure of accumulation, especially the large role of government and the relative strength of the labor movement. Government macroeconomic stabilization policies, the welfare state, and large powerful unions in the core industries, however, were part of an institutional framework that fostered capitalist profitability and economic growth. Government macroeconomic stabilization policies helped to prevent recessions, and the loss of sales and profits they entail. Social welfare programs, like unemployment insurance, acted as “automatic stabilizers” by moderating the decline in incomes and spending during recessions. The existence of unions and the steady increase in real wages helped to fuel booming demand for the products churned out by growing mass-production industries.

The Demise of the Golden Age

In the 1970s, the United States’ position as the unchallenged colossus of the capitalist world was suddenly threatened from multiple directions: rising international competition, spiking energy prices, declining productivity and profitability, and soaring inflation and unemployment. The United States’ trade deficit crept up in the course of the 1960s, and government deficits emerged late in the decade and persisted through the 1970s. Declining international confidence in the dollar led to the depletion of U.S. government gold reserves, as international holders of dollars demanded redemption of their dollars for gold. (The Nixon administration responded by ending the fixed-rate convertibility of the dollar for gold.) Inflation picked up in the late 1960s, ratcheting up from about 3% in 1966 to nearly 6% in 1971. While these rates may not look that high now, they were alarming at the time, coming on the heels of a seven-year period in which the annual inflation rate never exceeded 1.6%. (Nixon responded to the threat of inflation with unprecedented peacetime wage and price controls.) In 1973-1974, the first of two major “oil shocks” increased the price of petroleum four-fold, dramatically raising energy costs for both consumers and businesses. Workers’ wage demands outpaced the rate of productivity growth, driving up unit labor costs for businesses. The annual inflation rate spiked to over 10% in 1974 and again in each of the three years from 1979 to 1981. The annual unemployment rate topped 8% in 1975 and would reach nearly 10% in 1982.

The economy seemed trapped in the new nightmare of “stagflation,” so called because it combined low economic growth and high unemployment (“stagnation”) with high rates of inflation. Traditional macroeconomic policy tools seemed powerless to deal with this new beast. In the 1960s, the idea of a stable inverse relationship between unemployment and inflation (known as the “Phillips curve”) became part of the economic-policy orthodoxy. If the unemployment rate was high, inflation was likely to be low, and vice versa. This “tradeoff” left policymakers with the means to combat unemployment or inflation when either appeared separately. When facing a recession, policymakers could lower interest rates, increase government spending, or lower taxes to stimulate demand and bring down the unemployment rate, at the cost of some increase in the inflation rate. When dealing with inflation, they could raise interest rates, lower spending, or raise taxes to reduce demand and “cool off” the economy, at the cost of some increase in unemployment. When high rates of inflation and unemployment appeared simultaneously, however, orthodox policy seemed to lack a solution.

Gerald Ford pardoning a turkey.
President Ford declared inflation “public enemy number one” and initiated his “Whip Inflation Now” campaign. It failed.

What brought the “Golden Age” to such an inglorious end? The conditions that fostered successful capital accumulation and economic growth in the United States during the “Golden Age” broke down toward the end of this period. The postwar institutional framework, so successful in conventional terms for a quarter century, gave way to crisis not only because conditions changed around it, but because its own operation undermined its continued viability.

Our second key lesson: As conditions change, an institutional framework that had fostered capital accumulation and economic growth may come to hinder them.

All three pillars of the postwar framework were shaken during the 1960s and 1970s. Internationally, the United States no longer enjoyed uncontested economic, political, and military dominance over the capitalist world. The U.S. government had encouraged the reconstruction of the economies of Western Europe and Japan, both to undermine the appeal of communism in those countries and to demonstrate the superiority of capitalism to the rest of the world. The revival of manufacturing in Europe and Japan, however, also meant increased competition for U.S. firms in “core” manufacturing industries like steel and auto. Resistance to U.S. dominance in the global South, meanwhile, undermined U.S. companies’ access to cheap materials and energy resources. The 1973 embargo of Western buyers by petroleum-producing countries and the ensuing oil-price hike coincided with a low point in the United States’ ability to project its military and political power international-ly, just after the defeat of the U.S. military in Vietnam. “If instead of in 1973, OPEC had tried to raise prices and restrict production in 1953 or in 1963,” radical economist Stephen A. Marglin argues, “American marines would almost certainly have been dispatched.” In other words, under other political circumstances, the “oil crisis” of the 1970s would likely not have occurred.

Domestically, the so-called “capitalist-citizen accord” broke down in the politically explosive 1960s. Mass social movements—civil rights, women’s liberation, anti-war, environmental—were part of this change. Increased pressure for social reform also gave rise to increased government regulation of private business. Under the old “economic” regulation, government agencies had overseen specific industries such as railroads, trucking, telecommunications, utilities, or banks. In contrast, the “new social regulation,” including environmental, consumer-protection, occupational safety and health, and anti-discrimination laws, affected companies across all industries. Regulation was a way, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, for the government to respond to increasing demands for reform without increasing government spending (already surging for both domestic and war purposes). Capitalist corporations railed against the new regulations as imposing onerous new costs of doing business.

Jimmy Carter jogging on the White House grounds.
Federal Reserve chair Paul Volcker, appointed by President Carter, engineered a dramatic increase in interest rates. This detonated a deep recession.

Meanwhile, the relatively low unemployment of the postwar period meant that, by the 1960s, most active workers had no direct experience (or ingrained fear) of mass unemployment. In the late 1960s, the unemployment rate actually dipped lower (below 4% for each of the four years from 1966 to 1969). Marglin argues that low unemployment, along with the cushion offered by the welfare state in the event of unemployment, resulted in a declining “cost of job-loss.” Declining fear of unemployment emboldened workers to demand larger wage increases while reducing capitalists’ authority on the shop floor, their ability to enforce a high pace of work, and therefore the rate of productivity growth. Radical economist James Crotty points to the combined effects of rising wages and declining productivity growth in driving large increases in labor costs per unit of output. Unit labor costs, constant in the first half of the 1960s, grew at nearly 2% per year from1966 to 1967, and at over 6% per year from 1968 to 1969. These rising costs, in turn, ate into capitalists’ profits—the “full employment profit squeeze.”

It may seem strange that radical economists, whose sympathies lie with the working class, attribute the crisis to increasing wages and declining profits. They do not, however, mean to “blame” workers for the crisis. Rather, they are making two points:

First, unemployment is not just a sickness from which capitalist economies can be “cured,” to the benefit of all concerned. Unemployment is one of the cogs that capitalist economies require to function. Going back to Karl Marx, radical economists have understood the importance of unemployment in ensuring the conditions for profitability in capitalist economies. Capitalists are more able to resist demands for wage increases (or even to impose wage cuts) if there are many unemployed people seeking work, and the employers can credibly threaten to replace current workers with unemployed job-seekers. Capitalists’ ability to enforce a high pace of work also depends on the existence of substantial unemployment. The threat of firing, a key means for disciplining workers, is more credible if employers can easily replace fired workers and if workers losing their jobs would likely face a long and costly period of unemployment. Long periods of very low unemployment threaten capitalist profitability for both these reasons.

Second, profits are the lifeblood of capitalism. If capitalists do not expect to make a profit, they will not invest (purchase buildings, machinery, etc.) or hire workers. This is not to say that what is in the interests of capitalists (profits) is also in the interests of workers, except perhaps in the way one could say it is in the interest of an armed robber to get the victim’s money and it is in the interest of the victim to hand it over. Rather, it means that capitalists use their control of the means of production to extract a tribute, in the form of profit, from what the workers produce. The power of the capitalists over investment and employment in a capitalist economy means that, if the capitalists cannot extract their tribute, the rest of society will suffer.

The Capitalist Mobilization

The crisis of the 1970s marked the end of the “Golden Age” framework and the advent of “neoliberal” capitalism. The triumph of an economic policy agenda hostile to government economic intervention, social welfare programs, and labor organization was part of a broader shift to the right in U.S. politics. The right drew on currents in U.S. political culture pining for an imagined past of individual independence and blaming government regulation, taxation, and social programs for the perceived economic and moral decay of society. It tapped into and fueled a backlash against the civil rights and women’s liberation movements. Conservatives channeled this rage into attacks on social programs and affirmative action. It also drew on the power of nationalism, and the identification of many ordinary people with the superpower status of the United States. It promised to reverse recent blows to the national self-image—the defeat in the Vietnam War, the rise of OPEC and the oil shocks, the Iranian Revolution and hostage crisis, the apparent loss of economic dominance to international competitors—and to restore the country to its rightful place of worldwide supremacy. These were the pillars of right-wing “populism” in the 1970s and 1980s, and to a great extent remain so today.

As important as this “populist” appeal was, however, the “right turn” in U.S. economic policy also had distinctly elite sources. Facing multiple threats during the crisis of the 1970s, capitalists (especially the very largest capitalist corporations) mobilized in extraordinarily effective ways to ensure that the crisis was resolved in a way that was favorable to their shared class interests.

There were three major prongs in the capitalist mobilization. First, they financed policy organizations (or “think tanks”) which helped develop the conservative economic policy agenda. Capitalists channeled financial support to existing conservative think tanks, like the Hoover Institution and the American Enterprise Institute, which until then had limited resources and influence. They also supported new policy organizations, founded in the early 1970s, like the Institute for Contemporary Studies and the Heritage Foundation. This support helped vault both older and newer conservative think tanks to national prominence.

Second, they stepped up the scale and effectiveness of their lobbying efforts. Capitalists swelled the membership of existing business organizations, such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and large corporations created a major new organization, the Business Roundtable. Founded in 1972 (merging two earlier organizations), the Business Roundtable brought together the largest U.S. industrial companies. By 1974, its 150 members included 60 of the largest 100 industrial companies in the United States and 90 of the largest 200. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, large corporations had been on the defensive, facing a rising tide of environmental, occupational safety and health, and consumer-protection regulation. By the late 1970s, two major pieces of reform legislation, a labor-law reform proposal backed by the AFL-CIO and a bill to establish a consumer-protection agency, went down in defeat, largely due to the business mobilization against them. As political scientist David Vogel put it, “business turned the tide” politically, even before the watershed 1980 election brought a slew of new conservatives to Congress and Ronald Reagan into the White House.

Third, they directed support to conservative candidates for public office. Capitalist corporations do not always direct campaign contributions only to candidates they perceive as ideologically “pro-business.” Individual corporations also use campaign contributions to gain influence with elected officials and may contribute to candidates they do not regard as generally pro-business, but who they think are likely to win election and repay the favor of a campaign contribution. Companies in highly regulated industries and those highly dependent on government contracts are especially likely to engage in this kind of “pragmatic” campaign giving. By the 1978 election cycle, corporate political action committees began to shift away from pragmatic and toward ideological contributions. Rather than contribute to powerful incumbents large corporations increasingly directed their contributions to conservative challengers. This support helped shift the ideological composition of Congress in a “pro-business” direction, especially in the 1980 elections, and helped conservatives defend their gains in 1982.

The capitalist mobilization of the 1970s played a big role in bringing about a sea change in economic policy, sometimes known as the “right turn,” beginning late in the decade and continuing with the “Reagan Revolution” in the 1980s:

Reagan signs the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 at the “Western White House,” Rancho del Cielo.
Reagan’s policies were not reversed, and in many ways were deepened, by subsequent administrations, both Republican and Democratic.

The “full employment profit squeeze” ended in the late 1970s, when Federal Reserve chair Paul Volcker, appointed by President Carter, engineered a dramatic increase in interest rates. This detonated a deep recession and pushed the average annual (official) unemployment rate near 10% in both 1982 and 1983. Massive unemployment was not an unintended consequence of this policy, but the chosen means to finally break the power of workers to push for wage demands. By the 1980s, the power of the labor movement had been waning for years, and individual capitalist corporations had adopted an increasingly aggressive stance toward labor. This employer offensive intensified after Reagan broke the air-traffic controllers’ strike in 1982, widely interpreted as a signal to capitalists of “open season” on unions. Union decline accelerated, and strikes (which had become virtually unwinnable in the new anti-union climate) dropped off dramatically.

For all their railing against the evils of “big government,” conservatives did not slash federal expenditures during the 1980s. Rather, the priorities changed. Conservatives attacked social programs (though the “end of welfare as we know it” would have to wait for the 1990s and the Clinton administration) while the Reagan administration pursued an unprecedented peacetime military build-up. This spending spree was not only a boon to defense contractors, but also part of the administration’s program of rebuilding U.S. military power globally.

Meanwhile, corporations and the rich enjoyed a bonanza of tax cuts, abetted by “supply side” economists who argued that high marginal tax rates were destroying incentives to work and invest. Tax reforms in 1981 and 1986 cut the marginal tax rate on the highest personal incomes from 70% to 34%, raised the threshold for the estate tax, and cut corporate income tax rates.

Both the Carter and Reagan administrations pursued the rollback of industry-specific regulation on sectors like telecommunications, transportation, and finance. The deregulation of finance was mostly accomplished in the early 1980s (leaving only regulatory separations, dating back to the Depression, between commercial banking, investment banking, stock brokering, and insurance, to be repealed under Clinton during the 1990s). The Reagan administration also had a strategy for defanging the “new social regulation,” even when it could not repeal the regulatory legislation, by slashing funding and staffing of enforcement agencies.

The so-called Reagan Revolution was more than just a set of policies pursued by one administration. Reagan-era policies were not reversed—and in many ways were deepened—by subsequent administrations, both Republican and Democratic. Like the New Deal in the 1930s, the Reagan era laid the groundwork of a new set of relatively stable framework institutions. The so-called neoliberal social structure of accumulation, monstrous though it was, functioned as a framework for capital accumulation and economic growth for nearly three decades. Now it has fallen into crisis.

Where to from Here?

When looking at history retrospectively, it is sometimes hard to remember that the outcome was not a foregone conclusion—that things did not have to turn out the way they did. That the postwar framework was “interventionist,” however, does not automatically mean that its demise would give rise to a “free market” framework, as if economic policy swung like a pendulum between two fixed positions. Multiple policy proposals contended as possible ways out the 1970s crisis. Among these were proposals that would have increased the role of government in economic life: “incomes policy” (in which the government plays a much larger role in determining the distribution of income between labor and capital at a national level, as in many Western European social democracies) and “industrial policy” (in which the government plays a much larger role in directing investment to particular sectors of the economy, an idea given traction in the 1970s and 1980s by the success of Japan with such policies). The triumph of “neoliberal” capitalism in the wake of the 1970s crisis was not inevitable.

Our third key lesson: The outcome of a crisis is not preordained by the characteristics of the preexisting framework or the details of the crisis itself, but determined by the balance of power among different social groups with conflicting interests.

This last lesson is, perhaps, the most important in understanding the current economic crisis and its possible outcomes. Consider the last two profound crises of the U.S. economy, the Great Depression and the crisis of the 1970s. In the United States, the Depression resulted in a major upsurge in union organizing. Major industries like automobiles, steel, and long-haul trucking were organized for the first time. The national unionization rate more than tripled—from less than 7% to nearly 24% of the labor force between 1930 and 1947. This upsurge from below both benefited from and helped to force policy changes from above, including the creation of the modern welfare state. In other countries, where the balance of forces was different, the consequences of the Depression were different—including, of course, the rise of Nazism. During the crisis of the 1970s, capitalists, especially the largest capitalist corporations, mobilized with extraordinary effectiveness and used the crisis to help bring about policy changes they wanted. Again, the outcomes were not the same in all countries. The neoliberal policy agenda that took hold in the United States and the United Kingdom has not gone nearly so far in other rich capitalist countries.

The current crisis has created a fluid situation in economic policy. In response to the current recession, the most severe for the United States since the 1930s, the federal government has adopted “counter-cyclical” (anti-recession) policies that mainstream economists claimed were neither necessary nor desirable. It has extended large bailouts to private companies, mostly to financial institutions, though also to the ailing auto industry that was once the crown jewel of U.S. capitalism. The crisis has given rise to calls for new financial regulation, which would begin to reverse the de-regulating trends of the last thirty years. Major new regulation or reforms to the energy and health-insurance sectors are also possible. Some of these measures have met with sharp opposition, both from big capitalist corporations (e.g., health-insurance companies) and from reactionary populist movements. There has been little or no indication, however, of any resurgence in labor organizing or any mass mobilization in favor of new regulation, an expanded social-welfare state, a shift in labor-relations policy back in favor of workers, or other reforms, to say nothing of a more radical social agenda.

Few people outside the rabid right believe that capitalism faces imminent abolition in the United States. For those of us who would like to see the capitalist system replaced with a society based on workers’ control of their own workplaces, democratic control over the economy-wide allocation of resources, guaranteed access to basic goods (like adequate nutrition, shelter, health care, and education) as human rights, and a generally egalitarian distribution of wealth—to use the fashionable term, “socialism”—the outcomes of the present crisis are, nonetheless, a matter of great importance. The directions taken in economic policy at critical junctures in history can have a big effect on the conditions of life for millions of people and the conditions of political struggle for decades to come. These outcomes are unlikely to be positive without a resurgence of social movements—the labor movement and others—to counter the power of large corporations and right-wing populism.

If new movements do emerge, they should not become the foot soldiers of a particular government administration or political party (as, unfortunately, the union movement became for the Democratic Party after the New Deal). Independent grassroots movements might support some reform proposals from a particular party or administration, pressure others to go further than its sponsors would want, and oppose still others. They could develop reform proposals of their own, to challenge not just this or that economic policy, but the foundations of the capitalist system itself. They could spawn not only new organizations in workplaces and communities, but also new political parties, unbeholden to capitalist patrons. These are ways to fight for and win positive reforms, to be sure, but also, more importantly, to rebuild the fighting capacity of movements for radical social change.

Alejandro Reuss is an economist and historian, and a member of the Dollars & Sense collective.

Sources: David M. Kotz, Terrence McDonough, and Michael Reich, Social Structures of Accumulation: The Political Economy of Growth and Crisis, Cambridge University Press, 1994; Stephen A. Marglin and Juliet B. Schor, The Golden Age of Capitalism: Reinterpreting the Postwar Experience, Clarendon Press, 1990; Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Economic Analysis, Current Dollar and Real GDP www.bea.gov; Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, Annual Averages, Unemployment Rate, Historical Data, www.bls.gov; Samuel Bowles, David Gordon, and Thomas Weisskopf, Beyond the Waste Land: A Democratic Alternative to Economic Decline, Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1983; Michael Goldfield, The Decline of Organized Labor in the United States, University of Chicago Press, 1987; David Vogel, Fluctuating Fortunes: The Political Power of Business in America, Basic Books, 1989; James Crotty, “Review: Turbulence in the World Economy, by Robert Brenner,” Challenge, Vol. 42, No. 3, 1999; Dan Clawson and Mary Ann Clawson, “Reagan or Business: Foundations of the New Conservatism,” in Michael Schwartz (ed.), The Business Elite as a Ruling Class, Holmes and Meier, 1987; Joseph G. Peschek, Policy-Planning Organizations: Elite Agendas and America’s Rightward Turn, Temple University Press, 1987; Val Burris and Games Salt, “The Politics of Capitalist Class Segments: A Test of Corporate Liberalism Theory,” Social Problems, Vol. 37 No. 3, 1990; United States Department of the Treasury, “History of the U.S. Tax System,” www.treas.gov; Tax Foundation, “U.S. Federal Individual Income Tax Rates History, 1913-2009” www.taxfoundation.org; Internal Revenue Service, “Corporation Income Tax Brackets and Rates, 1909-2002,” www.irs.gov.

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Teetering on the edge

June 14, 2014

Updated: June 14, 2014 02:13 IST

Arvind Sivaramakrishnan

Iraqi Shiite tribal fighters deploy with their weapons while chanting slogans against the al-Qaeda inspired ISIL to help the military, which defends the capital in Baghdad's Sadr City, Iraq, on Friday.

 

Prime Minister of Iraq Nouri al-Maliki is ill-placed to offer any kind of leadership to counter the challenge posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

The fact that the extreme al-Qaeda offshoot Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) has captured the Iraqi city of Mosul, north-west of Baghdad, with minimal resistance has exposed several major problems. These result from the illegal U.S. and U.K.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 as well as the policies of the Nouri al-Maliki government in Baghdad, and now threaten civil war together with wider international consequences.

To start with, Iraqi forces in Mosul, the Nineveh provincial capital, were overrun very quickly on June 10; many abandoned their posts even though they outnumbered the attackers heavily. They said the ISIS forces were very well-equipped and trained, and ISIS even captured the Turkish consul-general and many of his staff in Mosul. The faction’s capture of Tikrit, only 140 km from Baghdad, was equally ominous, as Tikrit is the administrative capital of Iraq’s largest province, Anbar, which has a long border with Syria, ISIS’s geographical base and stronghold.

Second, ISIS itself continues to expand steadily, led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, whose real name is Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri, but who has adopted a name suggesting Iraqi origins. It has the stated aim of establishing a Caliphate stretching from western Iraq to North Africa. It also has a reputation for such brutality that even al-Qaeda has repudiated some of ISIS’s methods. At least 5,00,000 people have fled Mosul and are making their way toward the self-governing semi-autonomous province of Kurdistan, one of the few stable regions in the country. The office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has spoken of a rapidly developing humanitarian crisis. Kurdistan’s Peshmerga militia report, however, says that they now hold the crucial city of Kirkuk and have had no engagement with ISIS forces.

Polarised society

The current situation could worsen very rapidly, and responsibility for the potential national catastrophe rests both with the Maliki government and the George W. Bush administration, which directly after the invasion dismissed 7,00,000 Sunni members of the Iraqi army, leaving them jobless and giving Sunni militias a recruiting ground. Mr. Maliki, who has been Prime Minister since 2006, has since banned Sunnis from becoming military officers, and Sunni civil servants who had been Ba’ath Party members are not allowed to return to their posts. In effect, Mr. Maliki has himself undermined even the fragile sectarian balance Washington had belatedly tried to create in the period leading up to the purported U.S. military withdrawal in April 2010. He has, furthermore, created special militias which have come to be as feared as Saddam Hussein’s dreaded special units. The terrible sectarian war which broke out after the 2003 invasion also polarised Iraqi society and created what amount to apartheid zones in which the Sunni and Shia communities respectively live.

Far-reaching implications

The international implications are potentially very far-reaching. Baghdad reportedly appealed for U.S. airstrikes against ISIS in May, but there has been no official comment from Washington on this matter, though more assistance including drone strikes and further training involvement is apparently under consideration. There seems to be no question now of direct military deployment, even though the U.S. has an estimated 30,000 troops in so-called lily pad bases in various parts of Iraq. In addition, the British Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg, perhaps mindful of Parliament’s August 2013 rejection of military involvement in Syria, has opposed British intervention.

Major regional powers, however, may not be so hesitant. The hard-line Salafist monarchy in Saudi Arabia has offered to release some of the al-Qaeda members it has imprisoned on condition that they fight for Sunni militias in Iraq. Riyadh is also very uncomfortable about improved U.S.-Iran relations. Iran itself has offered logistical support to Mr. al-Maliki, who, for his part, is taking advantage of Riyadh’s increased anxiety following the Geneva deal reached between Iran, the West and Russia in November 2013. He made no statement when mortar shells were fired into Saudi Arabia at that time, and had earlier criticised his southern neighbours for aiding insurgents in Syria.

That Mr. Maliki is ill-placed to offer any kind of leadership is beyond doubt; he is still trying to assemble a coalition government after the general election left no party even close to a majority in the 328-seat parliament, and only 128 MPs actually turned up to vote on his June 12 request for emergency powers.

Meanwhile, the uncertainties in Iraq are causing international oil prices to rise, not least because hitherto accessible oil fields in the northern provinces could be cut off if fighting starts there. In sum, Iraq now faces a power vacuum which could be extremely dangerous, and although the United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has expressed his shock at the recent events, it is highly unlikely that any proposal for intervention will be put to the U.N. Security Council. Yet if the international community seems not to want to intervene, others will very probably take over, and Iraq now faces not only civil war but potential disintegration.

arvind.sivaramakrishnan@googlemail.com

Copyright© 2014, The Hindu

Counter to the spirit of counter-insurgency

June 14, 2014

Updated: June 14, 2014 01:57 IST

 

Subir Bhaumik

It is time India considers a repeal of AFSPA not merely out of a concern for human rights but also out of a desire to refocus its internal security regime. Such a law is inconsistent with the structure and spirit of our democracy and brings down India’s image at the global high table

Prime Minister Narendra Modi is bound to be receiving countless suggestions on how to strengthen India. These could range from “select inputs” to detailed wish lists on subjects as diverse as the economy to electoral reforms, homeland security to agriculture, education to health, and foreign policy to space policy, ensuring that by now his plate is full. But the most interesting request Mr. Modi has perhaps received so far is from an unassuming Manipuri, Irom Chanu Sharmila, who has been on hunger strike for 14 years. Ms. Sharmila has asked Mr. Modi to repeal the controversial (and draconian for the human rights community) Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958, better known by its acronym, AFSPA. She has promised to break her long fast if Mr. Modi assures her that AFSPA will be repealed.

AFSPA confers special powers on the armed forces to respond at will in “disturbed areas” in order to maintain law and order. In a “disturbed area,” a military officer can fire upon an unlawful assembly of five or more people if the need arises or even for illegal possession of fire arms. The military is free to use force, even causing death to those suspected of possible violence. No arrest and search warrants are required for any operation as in the provisions of the law. Under the blanket powers it confers on soldiers, there is always the fear of its misuse. The law is presently in force in whole or in parts of the States of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura.

Politics over repeal

In 1990, an amendment Bill was passed to include the State of Jammu and Kashmir under its purview. Manipur, however, withdrew the Act from some parts of the State after a huge agitation, but Ms. Sharmila would not withdraw her hunger strike unless the law itself is repealed. She started her hunger strike on November 2, 2000, after indiscriminate shooting by security forces left several locals dead in her locality. She has been forced fed all through, but her condition has deteriorated over the years.

After the fierce agitation in Manipur against AFSPA in 2004, the Central government appointed a five-member committee under the former Supreme Court judge, Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy, to review the Act and whether it needed to be toned down or repealed completely and replaced by a more humane legislation. On June 6, 2005, the committee recommended in its 147-page report the repealing of the Act unanimously. Interestingly, one of the five members of the Commission was a former Director-General (Military Operations) of the Indian Army, Lt-Gen. (retd.) V.R. Raghavan. Another member was former Home Ministry bureaucrat P.P. Srivastava.

Now why would such hard-core members of the security establishment advocate a repeal of AFSPA? This is a question that has rarely been asked. In fact, many a military officer with long years of experience in counter-insurgency in the Northeast and Kashmir, has argued after retirement that it should be repealed as it serves no purpose. But the serving military establishment has fiercely stalled AFSPA’s repeal, as viciously as it would fight a war against an enemy. Senior officers even launched a Facebook campaign to “save AFSPA.” The Defence Ministry has been pressured by the Army top brass; the United Progressive Alliance government did not dare place the Jeevan Reddy Commission’s report for discussion in Parliament, let alone adopt its recommendations.

Inducing a disconnect

But it is time India seriously considers a repeal of AFSPA — not merely out of a concern for human rights but also out of a desire to improve and refocus India’s internal security regime. A draconian law like AFSPA is inconsistent with the structure and spirit of our democracy and brings down India’s image at the global high table at a time when it is looking to be a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. It also encourages lazy, inefficient soldiering in counter-insurgency situations and actually proves to be counterproductive because it makes the security forces look like occupation armies and not people-friendly, which is what is required in counter-insurgency. One has to remember that counter-insurgency, which is an operation directed against one’s own citizens, is not against a foreign enemy. So, the primary focus of a counter-insurgency operation should be WHAM (winning hearts and minds), and not liquidation or elimination. AFSPA lets troops get away with murder and its frequent use encourages a culture of impunity which is counterproductive to WHAM; it actually increases the disconnect between the forces and the local population.

Compromising professionalism

With AFSPA around, military or paramilitary units do not feel the need for restraint or fire control (leading to incidents like the one at Malom which led Irom Sharmila to start her hunger strike). That leads to a sharp drop in professionalism and actually dehumanises and corrupts the Army and paramilitary forces.

An extreme case of such misuse and impunity has recently come to light after a case was filed by a Manipuri man who told the court that his brother and two others were kidnapped and killed by personnel of the Corps of Intensive Surveillance (CIS) unit deployed with the 3rd Army Corps in Rangapahar (Nagaland). He claims that a major had complained against some officers of the CIS unit to Army headquarters, alleging that they had murdered the three Manipuris behind an officer’s mess in Rangapahar. This rogue unit commanded by an otherwise highly decorated colonel had been earlier implicated by the Assam police in a case of robbery and extortion at the house of a surrendered rebel turned military contractor. In fact, former Army chief (and now Minister for Development of North Eastern Region) General (retd.) V.K. Singh had pulled up Lt. Gen. Dalbir Singh Suhag for “failure to maintain command and discipline” during these CIS operations. Lt. Gen. Suhag, then commander of the 3rd Army Corps and now the Army chief-designate, was spared prosecution by the court on the grounds that he was not directly involved in the murder of the three Manipuris.

The extent to which AFSPA has encouraged a culture of impunity and a compromise of professionalism can be gauged from cases such as that of Colonel H.S. Kohli (the “Ketchup Colonel”) who asked civilians to feign death, smeared them with tomato ketchup and claimed kills in an operation — all to score brownie points. It was later found that he had done all this in full knowledge (if not under explicit orders) of his immediate superior, Brigadier Suresh Rao of the 73rd Mountain Brigade. And these mountain brigades are supposed to be our key units in the order of battle against China.

If one were to lay emphasis on the primacy of WHAM in counter-insurgency, success in it should be judged not by body count in encounters or “area domination” but by how many rebels/militant groups have been compelled by an intelligent mix of persuasion, force, secret contact and psychological operations to abandon the path of armed struggle and return to normal life. AFSPA provides for lazy, non-professional soldiering, characterised by an absolute lack of focus and a conspicuous lack of a consistent doctrine of counter-insurgency. Operational action is rarely linked to clearly defined objectives — more kills rather than more surrenders from guerrilla ranks are likely to fetch better decorations and rewards, encouraging gung-ho commanders who can never gain the confidence of the people in areas of operation.

The former Manipur Governor, Lt.Gen. V.K. Nayar, made this point rather strongly in an article in the Indian Defence Review in October 1992. In fact, in his book, A Soldier Recalls, Srinivas Kumar Sinha points out that until the late 1960s, the Indian Army did not even have training manuals for counter-insurgency. Even now, many military institutions like the Counter-Insurgency & Jungle Warfare School (CIJWS) do not have appropriate campaign studies for units to be deployed for “internal security duties” in a counter-insurgency environment. In his Fighting Like a Guerilla, Rajesh Rajagopalan has aptly pointed out that the “conventional war bias” of the Indian Army explains its failure in counter-insurgency like in the Jaffna peninsula during the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) operations in the late 1980s. Therefore, the argument made by the military top brass that its units will be “crippled” in counter-insurgency situations without AFSPA is untenable. Long use of AFSPA has not helped end insurgencies; political settlements have. The reason for the failure of Indian military units to effectively root out insurgent groups in Kashmir or the Northeast stems from its failure to evolve an appropriate doctrine for counter-insurgency even after fighting insurgents for 60 years. This not only reveals the “learning failures” of an unimaginative military leadership but actually ends up alienating populations. It is time the new government realises the dangers of unleashing a force with a redeeming conventional war bias on its own people.

Army and internal security

In an article last year, the former GOC-in-C of the Northern Command, Lt. Gen. H.S. Panag, made this point rather tellingly on the situation in Kashmir. He wrote, “The large presence of the Indian army in the hinterland is not only unwarranted militarily, it is leading to complacency and resultant casualties. Given the current situation, a change in military strategy with a focus on counter-infiltration, a reduced but adequate deployment grid to act as a reserve and imaginative, selective and gradual lifting of the AFSPA will not only facilitate political strategy but also make the CI [Counter-Insurgency] campaign more efficient.”

Repeal of AFSPA should be seen as the first step in an effort to create a smarter and more effective counter-insurgency capability that draws more on information technology, psychological operations, political persuasion and conflict resolution rather than on overkill and mindless indiscretion. The government will have to evolve a counter-insurgency doctrine which will not only seek to keep the Army out of the “internal security” matrix to the extent possible and deploy other specifically trained and highly skilled forces that observe the principle of “minimum force,” but also not insist on an AFSPA-type legislation as a prerequisite for their deployment and demonstrate a respect for human rights and accountability in keeping with the letter and spirit of the Constitution.

(Subir Bhaumik, a former BBC Correspondent, is the author of Insurgent Crossfire and Troubled Periphery.)

Copyright© 2014, The Hindu

2002: How Communal Violence is Fomented (Learn from Modi’s Gujarat)Part I

 

The Feminist October 16, 2013

1. Role of the BJP and Allied Organisations – RSS/VHP/BD

1.1. From its declaration of the Gujarat bandh on February 28 and the Bharat bandh on March 1, following the Godhra tragedy, the questionable role of the Sangh Parivar in Gujarat and the ruling BJP’s active ‘fraternal’ support to them is clear. Within hours of the VHP’s bandh call, on the afternoon of February 27, the BJP’s Gujarat general secretary extended to them his party’s support.

1.2. Following the declaration of the bandh with detailed action plans, including steps taken to ensure police complicity, (see chapters — State Complicity, Police Misbehaviour, Volume III), many of the BJP’s elected representatives to the civic corporation or Parliament, were active in leading the mobs targeting Muslims.

1.3. They have been named in FIRs, fact-finding reports of citizens groups and newspaper reports. (see chapter– List of the accused, Volume III)

1.4. The tight control that outfits like the VHP and RSS have on the ruling BJP in Gujarat and on the dominant partner of the National Democratic Alliance at the Centre, has been evident for long. The Gujarat carnage has thoroughly exposed how even the murder of innocents could be condoned by a party, the BJP, ostensibly wedded to democracy and the rule of law.

1.5. Most shocking in this condonation of the Gujarat carnage, was the role of the deputy prime minister and home minister, Shri LK Advani, whose electoral constituency is Gandhinagar, the capital of Gujarat. On innumerable occasions, Shri Advani has been engaged in high praise for Shri Modi and given him a clean chit, when he should, in fact, have been upholding the Constitution of India. He referred to the Gujarat CM as the “best chief minister in 50 years” and has repeatedly praised Shri Modi’s Gaurav Yatra, which is nothing short of a celebration of the violence that his government effectively sponsored. It is in the course of his Gaurav Yatra that Shri Modi made some extremely offensive remarks, describing the relief camps as “breeding centres” for Muslims, which his government had no interest in promoting.

1.6. The close nexus between the Modi-headed BJP government in Gujarat on the one hand, and the RSS and VHP on the other, is apparent from the backing that each gave to the other’s statements, including those casting aspersions on constitutional authorities like the election commission and the chief election commissioner (CEC).

1.7. Three days after Shri Modi had hit out at the CEC, JM Lyngdoh, as well as the Congress party president, Smt. Sonia Gandhi, because they both happen to be of the Christian faith, on August 23, the international general secretary of the VHP, Shri Praveen Togadia, forcefully repeated the charge. Describing Shri Modi as the ‘he-man’ of Gujarat, he charged Lyngdoh with having an ‘anti-Hindu’ bias because of his decision to defer the elections in Gujarat. After delivering a lecture on Islamic terrorism, organised by the Indraprastha VHP at the Constitution Club in Delhi, Shri Togadia told reporters, “There are two similarities between Mrs Gandhi and Lyngdoh. They are both Christians and both of them don’t want early elections in Gujarat.” The CEC, he said, had also “betrayed his anti-Hindu bias” earlier, in a lecture delivered at Mussourie in the aftermath of the anti-Christian violence in Dangs (Gujarat) in 2000.

1.8. The clear connection and nexus between the democratically elected BJP government in Gujarat and outfits like the RSS and the VHP is evident from the former’s conduct, since the carnage. Reports of the Gujarat government’s deliberate avoidance of the arrest of at least 150 VHP, Bajrang Dal and BJP kingpins — their names figure in the FIRs filed by the police for directly leading the mobs who slaughtered Muslims and indulged in bloody violence — have been confirmed by the absence of their names in the charge-sheets.

1.9. Although Shri Modi’s government claims to have arrested over 2,500 persons involved in the post-Godhra riots, not a single mastermind from the VHP, BJP or Bajrang Dal named as riot perpetrators and mob leaders in various police complaints, have been arrested. On the contrary, police officials who have named these leaders from the Sangh Parivar in the FIRs are being pressured to either drop their names or book them under less serious charges. At least six BJP workers have been named as the main accused in the Naroda carnage case, where over 150 Muslim men and women were massacred after girls and women were brutalised sexually. The accused include, Shri Raju Sharma, Shri Kishan Kurani, Shri PJ Rajput, Shri Harish Rohara, Shri Bapu Bajrang and Shri Raju Chaubal, all identified as BJP and VHP activists. FIRs have been lodged against the six Sangh Parivar activists under IPC 302, 395 and 143, 149 and 148 for slaughtering and rioting. However, police have been instructed not to arrest the culprits. “It is politically incorrect to arrest them and we are under tremendous pressure not to act against them,” said police officers. (The Indian Express, March 9, 2002).

1.10. The Tribunal observes that in Gujarat, many cabinet ministers are simultaneously prominent leaders of the VHP. The home minister, Shri Gordhan Zadaphiya, is one of them. So, too, is the former revenue minister Shri Haren Pandya, a senior VHP functionary. He has been named by many witnesses who appeared before us, as trying to influence police not to take action against the accused. Minister for forests, Shri Prabhat Singh Chauhan and minister for cottage industries, Shri Narayan Laloo Patel are also two clear examples of this.

1.11. In Bhavnagar, which witnessed the worst communal violence in its history, there are FIRs against Shri Om Trivedi, the city VHP president, and Shri Mansukh Panjwani, a city BJP office bearer and former municipal councillor. Both Shri Trivedi and Shri Panjwani are alleged to have led mobs that set fire to over 80 Muslim-owned business establishments. They are, however, yet to be arrested.

1.12. Similarly, at Surendranagar, CR No. 54/2002 names six persons, who are primary members of the BJP and VHP, for instigating riots and indulging in mayhem. They have been charged under IPC 395, 436, 147, 148 and 149 but have not been arrested. These include district VHP in-charge, Shri Raju Vaishnav, BJP councillor, Shri Narottam Satwara, VHP joint secretary, Shri Dhiren Shukla, Shri Tulsibhai Ranchhod Bharwad and Shri Devji Bharwad, (the last three being active BJP workers). Each time chief minister Shri Modi and the union home minister and present deputy prime minister, Shri LK Advani were questioned on this matter, they have simply feigned ignorance. This attitude, on both their parts, amounts to shielding the guilty.

1.13. Soon after the Gujarat carnage, there was a nation-wide clamour for the dismissal or resignation of the chief minister and the imposition of President’s rule in the state. While on occasions the Prime Minister Shri Vajpayee gave the impression of being somewhat shaken by the events in Gujarat, it soon became evident that it was the RSS who had the final say, when the then BJP president, Shri Jana Krishnamurthy, effectively overruled the PM and asserted that Shri Modi’s resignation was out of the question.

1.14. It is clear from these associations, and the desire of the central and the Gujarat governments to grant these outfits legitimacy, that a close and abiding link exists between the BJP, the RSS and the VHP/BD. (Two years ago, the Gujarat government decided that there lift the bar on government servants from joining the RSS. The decision had to be withdrawn following country-wide protests, including those from the BJP’s allies in the NDA coalition at the Centre.)

1.15. On February 27, concerned over the strident posturing related to the campaign for building the Ram temple at Ayodhya on the site of the demolished Babri Masjid, none less than the Prime Minister of India, Shri Vajpayee, met with the working president of the VHP, Shri Ashok Singhal.. At this meeting, the RSS joint general secretary who was also present promised “to tone down the movement.”

1.16. Within days of the PM expressing some remorse over Gujarat during a visit to the US, Shri Singhal responded (September 22): “PM Vajpayee’s statement in the US regarding the Gujarat riots had lowered the image of the people of Gujarat. The prime minister made a ridiculous remark in the US that what happened in Gujarat was a matter of shame. The remark in fact is most shameful… Gujarat is a lesson for all times to come. Since Independence, Hindus had been victims of Muslim vandalism. Now the Hindus of Gujarat have beamed a message that jehadi programmes will no longer be tolerated in any part of the country. Gujarat has served as a warning to those trying to make India a pan-Islamic nation. There are one lakh madrassas (Islamic institutions) which are propagating a dangerous ideology to make India Dar-ul-Islam. They are breeding grounds for terrorists…”

1.17. The role played by the BJP and organisations like the RSS, VHP and BD in threatening internal peace and security in many parts of India is clear. There is an urgent need to put a complete stop to these activities, which are subversive of the Indian Constitution.

1.18. The Tribunal would like to record here, the ample evidence placed before it by expert witnesses, newspaper reports and fact-finding team reports, documenting the aggressive tone and posturing of organisations like the RSS, VHP and BD, especially since the BJP-dominated National Democratic Alliance came to power at the centre. These activities and such public posturing indicate several things:

u The intimate connection and the hold that these organisations have on the BJP, a party which heads the central government today;

u The avowedly anti-constitutional thrust of their intent and activities, whether in the matter of the construction of a temple on the site of a demolished mosque, in the absence of a court verdict on the matter, or on other issues;

u The series of arms training camps held all over the country, by the VHP and the Bajrang Dal, both off-shoots of the RSS, with close links to the BJP, since, at least, the year 2000. The Indian Arms Act, 1959, expressly prohibits the possession of arms by private parties without licence (the only exception being security agencies). The possession of a licence before a firearm is owned is a legal requirement. The Bombay Police Act, which applies to Gujarat, is similarly stringent on the question of possession of arms by citizens. The police are empowered to demand production of a licence. (Section 19 of the Arms Act). The exemption of the trishul (which in fact is a sharp, three-pronged weapon, which can cause fatal injury), from the provisions of the Arms Act, through a GR issued by the central government, is a clever ploy to encourage the militarisation and arming of a section of civil society by such groups. The swords that are also freely sold at the arms training camps, along with the air guns and rifles that are used for shooting practice, are clear pointers to the intent of these organisations. Yet, the police in BJP-ruled states and the BJP-led central government have turned a blind eye to such ominous developments.

u In the specific case of the Gujarat carnage, whether on the issue of the removal or resignation of Shri Modi from the chief minister’s post or others, it is evident that the BJP-led ruling NDA’s demeanour and actions have been strongly influenced by the utterings of the RSS and its siblings, the VHP and the BD.

1.19. The intelligence departments of three states in India — Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Rajasthan — have asked for a ban on the Bajrang Dal, on the grounds that it is generating “terror” and spawning home–bred terrorists. The testimony of many witnesses, from both communities, who appeared before the Tribunal, reinforces the assessment of the state police in Gujarat’s neighbouring states. “Many Gujaratis, Hindus and Muslims alike, felt that the Bajrang Dal had made a business of deliberately transforming ordinary people into terrorists. Where people had been living peacefully, they unnecessarily spun stories about Muslims, although, so far, Muslims had never given them any trouble. They wondered why people were being taught things like this.” (A witness’ testimony before the Tribunal.)

2. Training

2.1. In recent years, groups affiliated to the Sangh Parivar have been in the ascendant country-wide, given their increased access to political power, patronage and money. But the extent and scale of their mobilisation in Gujarat should be a matter of grave concern for the law and order machinery.

2.2. The BJP’s rule in Gujarat, after its return to power in February 1998, has been marked by frequent attacks on the religious minorities in the state and other anti-constitutional actions that remained unchallenged. (See chapter on Build -Up in Gujarat, Volume II).

2.3. Evidence led before the tribunal from Naroda Patiya, Naroda Gaon, Gulberg society, Chamanpura, Gomtipur and Rakhial (all in Ahmedabad), from Vadodara, Bharuch, Ankleshwar and from villages in Himmatnagar, Sabarkantha, and Panchmahal district reveals that local tensions built up after the formation of an RSS/VHP/BD unit in the area. These groups started marshalling young Hindus, assuming an aggressive attitude, distributing swords and trishuls and, in general, adopting a vigilante stance against ‘impending attacks from Muslims.’

2.4. The Tribunal has led specific and detailed evidence on the method of mobilisation and training adopted by the VHP and Bajrang Dal from four recruitsformer recruits. This explains the phenomenon whereby huge mobs surfaced so promptly all over the state during the carnage. It also explains the ability of these organisations to collect youngsters, indoctrinated with misconceptions and with hatred in their hearts, who were available at a signal from their leaders to commit murder, loot, arson and rape, and defy all laws, secure in the conviction that with the BJP in power, they would have full protection and need have no fear of the law and order machinery.

2.5. Reproduced here is the gist of the testimony of the four recruits/former recruits mentioned above, which provides a clear picture of the BD’s and the VHP’s mobilisation techniques. The enrolment fee for a new entrant to a BD shakha (cell) is Rs. 55. Once admitted, you are expected to attend meetings held around 8 p.m. every night, mostly on private premises, sometimes in small temples. Secret meetings for the more select are held once a week, later at night, around 10 p.m. Enrolment to the shakha entitles the volunteer to a card identifying him as a Bajrang Dal karyakarta (activist). If you help recruit 10 more youth, you are made a ‘VHP Mantri’. You are given a trishul the moment you enrol. You are told that trishuls were not meant to be kept inside a temple and worshipped but to be used to protect the Hindu faith. You are also told that the trishul should not be used to kill one’s ‘brothers’, but to save ‘our’ religion.

2.6. At the weekly meetings, members are told, more explicitly, that the trishuls are to be used against Muslims whenever there was a riot or a fight. If you killed Muslims, the organisation was there to protect you from penal consequences. If something happened to you, the organisation was there to take care of your family. If you did get arrested during the riots, all you had to do was to show your Bajrang dal membership card and the police was sure to let you go.

2.7. The VHP Mantris are assigned the responsibility of training 60-70 boys each day. What did the training involve? The training primarily involved compiling an exhaustive list of all Muslims living in the area. Members had to collect information about Muslim places of residence, property, businesses, family, etc. in the locality: Who lived where, how much they were worth, how many children they had, etc. All the information so gathered was to be passed on in the form of a written report that was maintained by the Mantri.

2.8. The Tribunal notes with horror, the level of impunity that such unlawful, armed organisations have come to enjoy in BJP-ruled Gujarat.

2.9. Apart from the detailed account of the four recruits/former recruits to the Bajrang Dal, other witnesses from Naroda, near Ahmedabad, and from Kheda, Bharuch and Panchmahal districts also gave evidence before the Tribunal about training camps being organised in their neighbourhoods. In all these cases, an intensive training of the BD/VHP volunteers began after September 2001. An advertisement encouraging youngsters to join the Bajrang Dal in large numbers had appeared in the Gujarat daily, Sandesh in August last year.

2.10. This suggests sinister preparation and planning for the Gujarat carnage long before the Godhra tragedy, by the Sangh Parivar affiliates, their leaders confident of impunity from the long arm of the law since they enjoyed the patronage of the ruling party.

2.11. Notwithstanding the in themselves startling and brazen revelations made by professor Keshavram Kashiram Shastri, the 96-year-old chairman of the Gujarat unit of the VHP, in an interview to rediff.com, there is evidently an attempt to deny past preparation and planning, intensively so in Gujarat since last year. In the interview (see Annexures, Volume I) Shri Shastri said that the list of shops owned by Muslims in Ahmedabad was prepared on the morning of February 28 itself. This was in response to the allegation that shops in Ahmedabad were looted on the basis of a list prepared by the VHP in advance, and that the violence was not a spontaneous outburst against the Godhra outrage. Asked why they did it, he responded, “’Karvunj pade, karvunj pade’ (‘It had to be done, it had to be done’). We don’t like it, but we were terribly angry. Lust and anger are blind.” He said the rioters were “kelvayela Hindu chokra” (“well-bred Hindu boys”). The impunity with which Shri Shastri could speak with the candour that he did in his interview on March 12, and again on March 29, when he told the same journalist that the organisation (VHP) had been asked to pull back, is shocking, to say the least. That the Gujarat government has taken no action whatsoever against Shri Shastri speaks volumes about the BJP-VHP nexus.

2.12. The constant invocation of caste Hindu symbols, militant and aggressive posturing, the possession of trishuls and swords and regular weapons’ training were elements of the methodical preparation of these cadres. Young men were told that Bajrang Dal workers should always greet each other with ‘Jai Shri Ram!’ to identify themselves. One of the centres used for physical training was at a theatre beyond Adalaj on the Gandhinagar road outside Ahmedabad. While trishuls were often distributed on payment of enrolment fees, members were asked to pay Rs. 310 for a sword. They were assured at the secret weekly training sessions that the swords were ‘legal’. They were also told that if ever the police found them, all they had to do was tell them that it was a Bajrang Dal sword, and no one would say anything. Swords were sold to the recruits quite openly and instructions on how to use them were given at the secret meetings.

2.13. At the advanced stage of training, the more seasoned members were told they would have to participate in fights or riots (ladhai-jhagda, danga-fasaad) whenever necessary. They said that, as Bajrang Dal leaders, they would, necessarily, be the most active, but young men, too, should always be prepared. They might be woken up in the middle of the night and should be ready to participate. The recruits were promised that when they participated in a riot, the organisation would pay them double the money that they lost in regular wages. Young men were also assured that if ever they were injured or killed during a riot, their families would receive adequate compensation.

2.14. The speeches at these meetings followed a basic pattern. Leaders would be brought in to brainwash the young members against Muslims. The single point agenda, evidence before the Tribunal has recorded, indicates that the desire was to demonise the Muslim community as also to create an armed cadre of young men, indoctrinated, full of hatred in their hearts, and sufficiently trained to perpetrate the grossest forms of physical abuse on their victims.

2.15. The Tribunal collected concrete information about the kind of mental training and brainwashing imparted to young men at the secret, weekly meetings – “We were told that until now it is the Muslims who have been harassing Hindus. ‘They have molested Hindu sisters and Hindu daughters. In Hindi films today, all the top heroes are Muslims, but there are no Muslim heroines. It is Muslims who are forging ahead in our country. They don’t let their daughters out in public but they spoil our Hindu daughters. Muslims are the ones who always use force. Our country was once a Hindu nation. The Muslims invaded us by force, married our mothers and our daughters and converted us to Islam.’”

2.16. According to the witnesses, in the Bajrang Dal camps, young men are told: “Under the pretext of prayers [namaaz], Muslims gather at 2 p.m. every day and maulvis instruct them in several activities. They specially employ young men, pay them a salary and send them to college to spoil Hindu girls. Muslims are involved in several such nefarious activities.” They said that they wanted to start a similar practice amongst Hindus. That was what the secret 10 p.m. meetings were meant for. Here the members would all band together, worship/invoke Hanuman and prepare “to give Muslims a fitting reply.” The secret meetings – gupt shakhas — also gave special training in the use of arms.

2.17. The Tribunal, therefore, concludes that abundant financial resources was one distinguishing feature of these outfits; that mercenary means are adopted to sustain the interest and participation of young cadres, ready to do the bidding of their hate-filled masters.

2.18. The Tribunal records that in Gujarat, quite apart from the political patronage and impunity from the law accorded to these outfits, there is enough money to finance the mobilisation. The source of such funds, used increasingly for blatantly unlawful and unconstitutional activities, needs to be investigated.

2.19. The Tribunal received detailed information on the Sangh Parivar’s shakha activities all over Gujarat, from the evidence of witnesses living in neighbourhoods where the training takes place. It should be a matter of priority for the local police to keep a tab on such activities, and curtail them, as they clearly disseminate hate literature to create permanent disharmony, fissures and tensions in Indian society and distribute arms and give arms training to pit one religious community against another.

2.20. Reports in credible national dailies and periodicals show that the VHP and the Bajrang Dal have been regularly conducting arms training camps in different parts of the country, for the last two years at least. (See Detailed Annexures, Volume III). From the statements on record, the objective behind these camps is evident, as are the objectives of their organisers and the instructors who conduct them: to spread venom against the minorities, especially Muslims and Christians, and to prepare a band of heavily indoctrinated, well-trained youth ready at a moment’s notice to pounce on the minorities. “We are preparing these able-bodied persons to fight any eventuality. With the ISI spreading its tentacles, these people are being trained to challenge the anti-Hindu forces… It is not the gun that matters, but self-confidence.” (Ved Prakash Sachchan, joint convenor of the UP unit of the Bajrang Dal, in an interview to The Times of India, June 13, 2001.) Such are the declared activities at these camps. The Tribunal has on its record, details of such arms training by these outfits in different states all over the country.

2.21. Given this background and the detailed evidence gathered by the Tribunal in the course of its investigations for a fortnight in Gujarat in May 2002, on the objectives and the kind of training given in the course of these camps, it is clear that they are a means to poison minds and generate hatred among Hindu youth towards other faiths and their followers. For Indian society, the consequences of such systematic and large-scale indoctrination and training, which is blatantly unconstitutional and seriously threatens internal peace, cannot be overemphasised. Instead of orienting them towards productive, creative and noble purposes, hate-mongers from the Sangh Parivar are busy mobilising youth for destructive activities. Anyone concerned about the health of Indian society and its progress should be acutely disturbed by these developments. Governments in the states and in New Delhi should view these developments with the urgency they deserve and halt such hate-driven mobilisation for violence.

2.22. Testimonies recorded by the Tribunal from Vadodara showed that about 2 months prior to the Godhra incident, a big meeting (sabha) was held at Tarsali bus stand near Vijaynagar colony. About 2-3000 people attended. It was a meeting for people from the Bajrang Dal and was attended by the international general secretary of the VHP, Shri Praveen Togadia as well a religious leader whose speech was telecast on the local television channel. The Tribunal recorded evidence that showed objectionable and criminal statements were made and telecast. Witnesses testified before the Tribunal saying that Hindus should not interact with Muslims on a normal basis but should only maintain good relations with those Muslims who have good looking wives, so that when the time came they could do what they had to do.

2.23. In August 2001, the VHP and the Bajrang Dal had organised a VHP Bharti (Join VHP) programme. Nearly one lakh people marched through the streets of Ahmedabad even though curfew was declared. This went on until September. One of the main programmes was held at the VHP’s Vanikar Bhavan, Paldi. Their main avahan (call) was, “Muslim ko nasht kar do!” (“Destroy the Muslims!”) Advertisements were also released, asking for membership.

3 Impunity from Punishment

3.1. Gross and heinous crimes instigated or committed by the Sangh Parivar with the connivance of the BJP-ruled state government, during the post-Godhra carnage in Gujarat, has been matched with a celebration of the crimes and open contempt for the rule law. On March 9, The Indian Express reported that even before the police had apprehended or prepared charge-sheets against the VHP and Bajrang Dal activists named in FIRs for attacking Muslims, the VHP had a team of 50 advocates ready to defend the killers in court. “The advocates will work in teams of five each. What is more, a core committee was set up on Tuesday to provide ‘succour’ to families of men on the run or in judicial custody… The VHP state wing general secretary, Jaideep Patel says, ‘These men (the Godhra victims and those facing police action for post Godhra crimes) have fought a religious battle. They also fought to protect Hindu lives under attack. Not only the VHP and Bajrang Dal, the whole community should come forward to help them’… Patel is not sure how many of his men are already in police reports or will be named in them, but says it ‘will not be less than 3,000’, including those responsible for the Gulberg society and Jakar Falia attacks.”

3.2. According to the same report in The Indian Express a top Bajrang Dal functionary, Shri Harshad Gilletwala said, “Cases are being registered against our men all across the state — Ahmedabad, Surat, Panchmahal. Maybe some of our men may have been involved in reprisals, being emotionally charged by the Godhra attack. But in most cases they are being falsely implicated.”

3.3. Incidentally, Shri Gilletwala himself faces similar charges. He is named in several cases of rioting in Ahmedabad over the last few years, the most infamous being the 1999 Bhagyodaya restaurant case. Gilletwala and a gang of Bajrang Dal men allegedly set fire to the restaurant in the Satellite area and burnt alive one of its Muslim owners in July 1999. (See chapter on Build-Up in Gujarat, Volume II)

நன்றி: http://hillele.org/2013/10/16/2002-how-communal-violence-is-fomented-learn-from-modis-gujaratpart-i/

Vasundhara Raje's Rajasthan government shows way in labour reforms

http://www.financialexpress.com/story-print/1258240

P. Vaidyanathan Iyer Posted online: Sunday, Jun 08, 2014 at 0000 hrs

Mumbai : The Vasundhara Raje-led government in Rajasthan has taken the lead in bringing about dramatic changes to Central labour laws, which reformists have long argued are holding back job creation in the country. Labour laws form part of the Concurrent List and the Union government has often claimed pre-eminence in allowing amendments proposed by states to the legislations framed by the Centre.

The Raje Cabinet on Thursday cleared state-level amendments to three critical and archaic Central government labour legislations — the Industrial Disputes Act, Contract Labour Act and the Factories Act — seeking to liberate the corporate sector from the shackles of stringent requirements of the laws. The related Bills will be introduced in the Assembly early next month and then referred to the President for his assent.

When contacted, Raje said, “I had promised 15 lakh jobs and this is one area which desperately needs to be opened up. I don’t have a choice.” Describing it as “creating a habitat for job creation”, she said she would try to find innovative ways to further reforms.

“Policy-level changes require political will. For decades, everybody has advocated an overhaul of labour laws. What we did will change the paradigm,” Rajiv Mehrishi, Chief Secretary, Rajasthan, told The Sunday Express.

According to the changes in the Industrial Disputes Act, government permission will not be required for retrenchment of up to 300 workers. The Act, as it stands now, allows retrenchment of up to only 100 workers. The Rajasthan Cabinet has also introduced a three-year time limit for raising disputes and increased the percentage of workers needed for registration as a representative union from 15 per cent to 30 per cent. In the context of politicisation of trade unions, this raises the bar.

As far as the Contract Labour Act is concerned, the amendments raise the applicability of the Act to companies with more than 50 workers from the current 20. In the Factories Act, currently applicable to premises with more than 10 workers with power and 20 without power, the amendments raise these numbers to 20 and 40, respectively.

Senior BJP leader and former disinvestment minister Arun Shourie had recently said that should Narendra Modi become the Prime Minister, he could bring about genuine federalism by allowing more progressive states to change their laws. When contacted, Shourie said Section 254 (2) of the Constitution of India allows states to enact laws that do not necessarily conform to the Central law provided they receive the President’s assent.

“As Gujarat Chief Minister, Modi has himself complained in the past that the Central government was sitting on many of the changes proposed by his state,” said Shourie. “Such changes to laws can be brought about in a variety of issues and this will ‘unfreeze’ policy environment,” he added.

In the past, Modi has accused the Centre of adopting a policy of “coercive federalism” and pushing states to a subordinate position by monopolising all powers of financial allocations, reducing even the constitutional rights of states. Rajasthan’s bid to reform labour laws will be a test case for the Centre and will set the direction for all 29 states which plan to bring about progressive changes to issues that are part of the concurrent list.

When asked if having the same political party at the Centre would help Rajasthan in obtaining the President’s assent, Mehrishi said, “The Central government is equally keen to create jobs. All industry associations have been saying for decades that labour law changes are a must for creating more employment opportunities.”

நன்றி: http://www.financialexpress.com/story-print/1258240

BJP's rhetoric on Uniform Code undermined by its silence on laws favouring majority

 

Shoaib Daniyal

From apostasy laws to differential tax rules, there is no dearth of legislation in India based on religion. Adding these to its reform list would make the BJP’s job of introducing a UCC that much easier.

http://scroll.in/article/666262/BJP%27s-rhetoric-on-Uniform-Code-undermined-by-its-silence-on-laws-favouring-majority

The Bharatiya Janata Party’s resounding win in the Lok Sabha elections has brought one of its pet issues back into focus: the establishment of a Uniform Civil Code to replace the current system by which followers of different faiths are subject to religious personal laws relating to marriage, inheritance and other matters.

In theory, the argument that religion should play no role in the laws of a secular republic is difficult to refute and indeed the establishment of a progressive legal code would do much good. But in practice, the BJP’s rather high-pitched espousal of the UCC has perhaps done more harm to the cause than help it.

The party’s portrayal of religious personal law as the one barrier standing between India and “true” secularism is hyperbolic. The situation is far more complex. Contrary to common knowledge, religious personal laws in India have not been static. Significant parts of these codes, especially those relating to minority communities, have already been reformed as a result of legal intervention resulting from cases challenging these statutes.

For instance, despite Rajiv Gandhi’s decision to reverse a court decision in 1985 Shah Bano case ordering a Muslim man to pay his wife maintenance, the courts have reaffirmed the rights of Muslim women to alimony. The egregious triple talaq rule was overruled in the Shamim Ara case in 2002, which held that the husband did not have a unilateral right to verbal divorce when there was “no substantial evidence” of the man having pronounced the three words.

It is rarely acknowledged but there are a number of other provisions in India that work on explicitly religious or communal principles, all of which are also in urgent need of reform. On these the BJP has maintained a studied silence, in some cases even propagating them. The notable provisions are listed below:

Gujarat’s apostasy law: it might come as a surprise that India has an apostasy law, but in 2003, a time of great communal polarisation, the Gujarat legislature passed the Freedom of Religion Act, a wonderfully Orwellian name for a law that restricts religious freedom. The act made it mandatory for a person converting to another religion to take permission from the district magistrate first. Only if the district magistrate is convinced that the convert has undergone a true religious transformation is the change allowed. That an ostensibly secular state sits in judgment of whether a person’s religious choice is true or fraudulent might have been funny, if it wasn’t for the four-year jail sentence the law carries.

Gujarat’s Disturbed Areas Act: In Gujarat it is illegal for Hindus and Muslims to enter into a property transaction unless it has the permission of the government. As of 2013, 40% of Ahmedabad was notified under the act. While religious ghettoisation is a fact in most Indian cities, this legislation makes it official government policy.

Religion-based reservations: A Presidential Order dating back to 1950 makes all non-Hindu Dalits ineligible for Scheduled Caste reservations, saying only Hindu Dalits can avail of reservations in government jobs, higher education and legislative bodies. This was amended to include Sikh Dalits in 1956 and Buddhist Dalits in 1990, but it has still not been extended to the other religious groups. This also means that Christian and Muslim Dalits are not protected against anti-Scheduled Caste atrocity legislation.

Tax breaks on the basis of religion: A well-known yet oddly uncontroversial measure, the Hindu Undivided Family provides, in the words of T Ramanujam, “almost a perfect medium for tax avoidance”. It is open only to Hindus, Sikhs, Jains and Buddhists.
Though legal intervention is helping to reform religious law, the process is slow and haphazard, very often depending on the interpretation of a single judge. In such a situation, the establishment of a standard, progressive UCC would help by speeding up the reform and making them available to all Indians at a stroke. As the reform of Hindu personal law in the 1950s showed, the benefits of such a move would be wide-reaching.

Given the physical insecurities of religious minorities in India, however, introducing a UCC will be difficult. It is strange that the party that is its greatest proponent, the BJP, simultaneously champions theological issues such as temple construction and the mainstreaming of Hindu systems of medicine. This has led to fears that the UCC will be used to marginalise the interests of minority communities while submitting to majoritarian impulses.

If it is serious about introducing a UCC, the BJP, and consequently the government, must adopt a principled stand against all religion-based laws, working concurrently to remove discriminatory legislation, such as those discussed above. In this bundled approach lies the best chance of introducing a uniform code.

நன்றி: http://scroll.in/article/666262/BJP%27s-rhetoric-on-Uniform-Code-undermined-by-its-silence-on-laws-favouring-majority

370 வது சட்டப்பிரிவும் இந்துத்துவ அரசியல் கோட்பாடும்

ஷாகுல் ஹமீது

Published: 02 June 2014

http://www.keetru.com/index.php/2014-03-08-04-35-27/2014-03-08-12-18-14/26627-370

ஜம்மு காஷ்மீர் மாநிலத்துக்கு சிறப்பு அதிகாரம் வழங்கும் சட்டப்பிரிவு 370 ஐ கலைப்பதற்கான முதற்கட்ட நடவடிக்கையில் பாஜக அரசு தீவிரமாகி உள்ளது. இதற்கான பொறியைத்தான் ஜம்மு காஷ்மீர் மாநிலத்திலிருந்து தேர்ந்தெடுக்கப்பட்ட மத்திய பாராளுமன்ற விவகாரத்துறை இணை அமைச்சர் ஜிதேந்திர சிங் தூவி விட்டிருக்கிறார். இந்த விவாதம் ஏதோ யதார்த்தமானது அல்ல. பாஜக அரசால் திட்டமிட்டு வெடிக்க வைக்கப்பட்ட விவாதம்தான். 370வது பிரிவு குறித்து சிறிது அளவேனும் வாசிப்பு இல்லாத இந்திய பாமர மக்கள் மனதில் ஒரு எண்ணத்தை அல்லது ஒரு கருத்தியலை பாஜக தூவி விட்டிருக்கிறது. இந்த பாமர இந்தியன் இந்த கேள்வியை தற்போது ஜிதேந்திர சிங்கின் பேட்டிக்குப் பின்பு கேட்க ஆரம்பித்துள்ளான். அது என்ன ஜம்மு காஷ்மீருக்கு மட்டும் சிறப்பு அதிகாரம்? எல்லா மாநிலங்களையும் ஒன்றாக பார்ப்பதுதானே நியாயமாக இருக்க முடியும்? இந்தக் கேள்வியின் மேற்பரப்பு நியாயமாகத்தான் தோன்றும். ஆனால் அதன் உட்பரப்பை சிறிது ஆய்வு செய்தால் இந்த சட்டப்பிரிவின் பின்னால் உள்ள மிக சக்தி வாய்ந்த சதி அரசியல் என்னவென்று புரியும். எப்படியாவது ஜம்மு காஷ்மீரிலிருந்து இந்த சட்டத்தை பறித்து விடவேண்டும் என்ற இந்துத்துவ கோட்பாட்டாளர்களின் அரசியல் மிகவும் விரிவாக விவாதிக்க வேண்டிய விஷயம்.

இதே சட்டப்பிரிவு மகாராஷ்டிராவின் விதர்பா, மரட்வாடா குஜராத்தின் சவுராஷ்டிரா, கட்ச் ஆகிய பகுதிகளில் அமலில் உள்ளது. மேலும் ஜம்மு காஷ்மீருக்கு இருப்பதைப் போன்ற சிறப்பு அதிகாரங்கள் இமாச்சல பிரதேசம், அருணாச்சல பிரதேசம், அந்தமான் நிக்கோபார் தீவுகள், நாகலாந்து போன்ற பகுதிகளிலும் நடைமுறையில் உள்ளன. ஆனால் அங்கு எல்லாம் இந்த சட்டத்தை குறித்து கேள்வி எழுப்பாத பாஜக, ஜம்மு காஷ்மீர் மாநிலத்தில் மட்டும் கேள்வி எழுப்புகிறது என்றால் இதன் பின்னால் மிக வலுவான திட்டமிடுதலுடன் கூடிய ஒரு பயங்கரவாத அரசியல் உள்ளது.

நாடு சுதந்திரம் அடைவதற்கு முன்பு இந்தியா 526 சமஸ்தானங்களால் கட்டமைக்கப்பட்டிருந்தது. சுதந்திரத்திற்குப் பின்பு சமஸ்தான முறையிலான ஆட்சியமைப்பு கலைக்கப்பட்டு கூட்டாட்சி முறை அடிப்படையில் மாநிலங்களாக பிரிக்கப்பட்டன. அப்போது ஹைதராபாத், ஜம்மு காஷ்மீர், ஜுனாகத் ஆகிய மூன்று சமஸ்தானங்கள் இந்திய கூட்டாட்சியில் இணைய மறுத்துவிட்டன. இதில் ஹைதராபாத் சமஸ்தானம் இந்திய ராணுவ பலத்தின் உதவியால் இந்தியாவுடன் இணைக்கப்பட்டது. ஜுனாகத், மக்கள் வாக்கெடுப்பு மூலம் இணைக்கப்பட்டது. பூகோளவியல் அடிப்படையில் ஹைதராபாத்தும் ஜுனாகத்தும் இந்தியாவின் உட்புறப் பகுதியில் இருந்தன. இதனால் இந்த இரு மாகாணங்களும் இந்தியாவுடன் இணைக்கப்பட்டால்தான் தெளிவான கூட்டாட்சி முறையை அமல்படுத்த முடியும். ஆனால் ஜம்மு காஷ்மீர் மாநிலம் இந்தியாவின் எல்லையில் அமைந்திருந்ததால் அம்மக்களுக்கு இரண்டு வாய்ப்புகள் கொடுக்கப்பட்டன. பாகிஸ்தான் அல்லது இந்தியா இந்த இரண்டில் ஒன்றைத் தேர்ந்தெடுக்கும் உரிமை அவர்களுக்கு கொடுக்கப்பட்டது. இதிலும் ஒரு பெரும் சிக்கல் என்னவென்றால் ஜம்மு காஷ்மீரின் 80 சதவீத மக்கள் முஸ்லிம்கள், ஆட்சியாளர் இந்து மன்னர் ஹரிசிங். இதில் மன்னருக்கும் மக்களுக்குமிடையே ஒரு பாரிய இடைவெளி உண்டு.

ஜம்மு காஷ்மீர் மக்களுக்கு இந்த இரண்டு வாய்ப்புகளை தேர்ந்தெடுப்பதிலும் சிக்கல் இருந்தது. அவர்களுக்கு இந்தியாவுடனோ பாகிஸ்தானுடனோ இணைய விருப்பம் இல்லை. தனி நாடாக ஜம்மு காஷ்மீரை வைத்துக்கொள்ள வேண்டும் என்பதுதான் பெரும்பான்மை மக்களின் விருப்பமாக இருந்தது. அதற்கான‌ வலுவான காரணங்களும் உண்டு. 1846ம் ஆண்டு அமிர்தசரஸ் உடன்படிக்கையின் படி ஜம்மு காஷ்மீர் பள்ளத்தாக்கில் ஒரு நெருக்கடியான சூழ்நிலை தொடர்ச்சியாக இருக்க வேண்டும் என்பதற்காக பிரிட்டிஷார் திட்டமிட்டு அந்த அழகிய ஆப்பிள்தோட்டத்தை வெறும் 75 லட்ச ரூபாய் பணத்தைப் பெற்றுக் கொண்டு கொடூர அடக்குமுறை ஆட்சியாளர்களான டோக்ரா மன்னர்களுக்கு விற்றனர். இதை இப்படியும் கூறலாம், கொலை வாளுடன் முஸ்லிம் இனமக்களின் இரத்த பசிக்காக ஏங்கி கொண்டிருந்த கும்பல்களிடம் அந்த மக்களின் உயிரை பிரிட்டீஷார் அடகுவைத்தனர். ஏனென்றால் பிரிட்டிஷாரின் அடக்குமுறைக்கு காஷ்மீரின் மண்ணின் மைந்தர்கள் கடும் எதிர்ப்பாளர்களாக இருந்தார்கள். பிரிட்டிஷ் ராணுவத்தால் அவர்களை ஒன்றும் செய்ய முடியவில்லை. இதன் காரணமாகத்தான் டோக்ரா கொடுங்கோலர்களிடம் அந்த மக்களை பிரிட்டீஷார் ஒப்படைத்தனர். இது முதற்கொண்டு அந்த மண்ணின் மைந்தர்கள் பல்வேறு உயிர் போராட்டங்களை நடத்தி வருகிறார்கள்.

தொடர்ந்து அநியாய ஆட்சியாளர்களர்களின் தொடர் அடக்கு முறைகளுக்கு ஆளாகி வந்த அந்த மக்களின் பொதுப் புத்தியில் நம்பிக்கையின்மை என்பது அதிகரித்து விட்டது. இனி அடக்கு முறைக்கு ஆளாகமல் இருக்க வேண்டும் என்றால் நமக்கான அரசை நாமே கட்டமைக்க வேண்டும் என்ற கோட்பாடு பெருவாரியான காஷ்மீரிகளின் பொதுப் புத்தியில் ஆழமாக வேரூன்றி விட்டது. இதனால்தான் இந்த இரு வாய்ப்புகளையும் அவர்களால் ஏற்றுக்கொள்ள முடியவில்லை. இந்நிலையில்தான் இந்தியா-பாகிஸ்தான் இரு அரசுகளும் காஷ்மீர் பிரச்சினையை மேலும் வலுவாக வேரூன்றி போனதற்கான பாரிய தவறை செய்தன‌. இரு நாட்டு ராணுவங்களும் காஷ்மீரை கைப்பற்ற பலமாக மோதிக் கொண்டன. இதைத் தொடர்ந்து காஷ்மீரின் மூன்றில் ஒரு பகுதியை பாகிஸ்தான் கைப்பற்றிக் கொண்டது. மீதி இரண்டு பாகம் இந்தியா வசம் வந்தது. இதைத் தொடர்ந்து அந்த மக்களின் விருப்பத்திற்கு மாற்றமாக 1947 அக்டோபர் 26ம் தேதி காஷ்மீர் இந்தியாவுடன் அதிகாரப்பூர்வமாக இணைக்கப்பட்டது.

இந்த இணைப்பு உடன்படிக்கை தற்காலிகமானதுதான். இந்த இணைப்பு ஒப்பந்தத்தின் படி ராணுவம், வெளியுறவு, தகவல் தொடர்பு இந்த மூன்று துறைகளை விடுத்து அனைத்து அதிகாரமும் காஷ்மீர் மக்களின் கைவசம் கொடுக்கப்பட்டது. இணைப்பை நிரந்தரமாக்க வேண்டும் என்றால் காஷ்மீர் மக்களிடம் பொது வாக்கெடுப்பு நடத்த வேண்டும் என ஐ.நா பாதுகாப்பு கவுன்சிலில் 21.4.1948ம் ஆண்டு 47வது எண் கொண்ட தீர்மானம் நிறைவேற்றப்பட்டது. இந்த தீர்மானத்தை மழுங்கடித்து காஷ்மீர் மக்களின் பொது புத்தியிலிருந்து வாக்கெடுப்பு என்ற கருத்தியலை உடைக்க வேண்டும் என்ற நோக்கத்தில்தான் 370 வது சட்ட பிரிவு 1948ம் ஆண்டு ஆகஸ்டு மாதம் நிறைவேற்றப்பட்டது. இந்திய அரசின் சதியை உணர்ந்த சட்ட மாமேதை அம்பேத்கர் அப்போதே இந்த சட்டத்தை எதிர்த்தார்.

இந்த சட்டத்தின்படி காஷ்மீர் மாநிலத்தில் உள்ள நிலங்களை வெளி மாநிலத்தைச் சேர்ந்தவர்கள் வாங்க முடியாது. காஷ்மீருக்கு என்று தனி குடி உரிமை, சொத்துரிமை, அடிப்படை உரிமைகள் போன்ற சட்டங்களை வகுத்துக்கொள்ள முடியும். மேலும் காஷ்மீரின் மாநில ஆட்சி மற்ற மாநிலங்களைப் போன்று அல்லாமல் 6 ஆண்டுகள் வழங்கப்பட்டுள்ளது. இந்த சட்டத்தின் அடிப்படையில் காஷ்மீருக்கு என்று தனி அரசியல் சாசன சட்டம் 17.11.1956ம் ஆண்டு நிறைவேற்றப்பட்டது. இதே போன்று காஷ்மீர் மாநிலத்திற்கு மட்டும் தனி தேசியக் கொடி உருவாக்கப்பட்டது உட்பட பல்வேறு தனி சிறப்பு சலுகைகள் இந்தியாவுடன் அவர்கள் தொடர்ச்சியாக இணைந்திருப்பதற்காக வழங்கப்பட்டது. ஆனால் மைய அரசு பல்வேறு சட்டத்திருத்தங்களைக் கொண்டு வந்து இந்த சட்டத்தை செயல் இழக்கச் செய்து வருகிறது. இது வரை அம்மண்ணின் மைந்தர்களின் உரிமைகளை பறிப்பதற்காக 50க்கும் மேற்பட்ட சட்டத்திருத்தங்களை இந்திய மைய அரசு கொண்டு வந்துள்ளது. 370வது பிரிவில் சில சிறப்பு அம்சங்கள் மட்டும்தான் எஞ்சியுள்ளன. மேலும் இந்த சட்டம் காஷ்மீருக்குத் தேவையா இல்லையா என்பதை காஷ்மீர் மக்கள் தான் முடிவெடுக்க வேண்டுமே தவிர ஆர்.எஸ்.எஸ்ஸோ பாஜகவோ அல்ல.

ஆனால் ஆர்.எஸ்.எஸ். 370வது பிரிவை ரத்து செய்ய பல்வேறு செயல் திட்டங்களை வகுத்து உள்ளது. இந்துத்துவவாதிகள் இந்த சட்டத்தை துடைத்தெறிய வேண்டும் என்று துடியாய் துடிப்பதன் பின்னால் சக்தி வாய்ந்த அரசியல் உள்ளது. ஜம்மு காஷ்மீர் மாக‌ணத்தில் உணர்வு உள்ள இஸ்லாமியர்களின் எண்ணிக்கை அதிகமாக உள்ளதாலும் முஸ்லிம் இன மக்கள் பெரும்பான்மையாக உள்ளதாலும் முஸ்லிம்களின் முழு கட்டுப்பாட்டில் அந்தப் பகுதி சென்று விடக்கூடாது என்பதற்காக இஸ்ரேல், பாலஸ்தீனத்தில் நடைமுறைப்படுத்தியதைப் போன்று இந்துச் சமூகத்தை சேர்ந்த கந்து வட்டிக் கும்பல்களான மார்வாடி இன மக்களின் குடியிருப்புகளை காஷ்மீரில் அதிகப்படுத்தி முஸ்லிம்களின் பெரும்பான்மையைக் குறைக்க வேண்டும் என்பதுதான் அவர்கள் இந்த சட்டத்தை எதிர்ப்பதற்கான அடிப்படை கருத்தியல். இந்துத்துவ சக்திகளின் இந்த கருத்தியலுக்கு எதிராக 370வது சட்டப்பிரிவு இருப்பதால்தான் அதை எப்படியாவது துடைத்தெறிய வேண்டும் என்ற வேலையில் இறங்கி உள்ளார்கள். கண்டிப்பாக மோடி ஆட்சிக் காலம் முடிவதற்குள்ளாக‌ 370வது சட்டப்பிரிவை நீர்த்துப் போகச் செய்வார்கள். இதைத் தொடர்ந்து காஷ்மீரில் போராட்டம் வெடிக்கும். காஷ்மீரிகள் வீசுகின்ற கற்கள் மோடி அமர்ந்து இருக்கின்ற பாராளுமன்றத்தை சீர்குலைக்கும் என்பது திண்ணம்.

- ஷாகுல் ஹமீது (ibnsheik@gmail.com)

நன்றி:  கீற்று