Sunday, June 30, 2013

Night of HORROR

June 30, 2013

When will the villagers of Kunan Poshpora in Kashmir, who were subjected to mass sexual violence by soldiers 22 years ago, get justice?

Silenced...Photo: Nissar Ahmad

Silenced...Photo: Nissar Ahmad

he night of February 23, 1991, in the snow-bound villages Kunan Poshpora in Kupwara district of Kashmir, families were indoors, warming themselves with kangris or under quilts. The quiet of the night was shattered by sudden loud knocking on their doors. The army had arrived for another “crackdown” to flush out terrorists who they suspected were hiding in their village.

Militancy was at its peak in the valley, and it was routine for security forces to surround villages and pull men out of their houses for questioning. That night they were taken into two of the houses which were converted into interrogation torture chambers. Men were laid face down on logs, their face immersed in pots of chilli powder, and they were administered electric shocks.

Unknown to the men, bands of soldiers had entered each of their homes, where they brutally raped by turns girls and women from the ages of eight to 80, even as screaming children watched in horror. One woman recalls that — while she was still conscious — eight drunken men took turns in raping her. Another testifies that her four-year-old daughter was so traumatised seeing her mother gang-raped that she jumped out from her window, leaving her permanently disabled. Next morning, the men were instructed not to return home until the army contingent left. When they did, they found their houses ransacked, the women in their homes naked and bleeding, often unconscious, surrounded by devastated children.

Two days later, they gathered courage to file their complaint in the police station, but were refused. Only after they demonstrated outside his office, District Magistrate S.M. Yasin visited their village. He reported later that the soldiers “behaved like violent beasts”. Under his pressure, the police registered an FIR on March 18, 1991. But a month later, the Director Prosecution concluded that the case prepared by the police was “unfit for launching criminal prosecution”. Another month later, on October 21, the criminal case was closed without trial as the perpetrators were “untraced”.

For a desolate 11 years, nothing moved in what is probably the largest single case of mass sexual violence in independent India. The State was under a prolonged spell of President’s rule. Subsequently a succession of elected governments came and went, but no Chief Minister found time to reach out to the forgotten stricken people of Kunan Poshpora, nor any of the State’s senior political leaders.

In 2004, the impoverished villagers, mostly small farmers and farm workers, pooled money to file an application for belated justice in the State Human Rights Commission. The Commission recorded statements of many of the survivors (although the villagers took the precaution from the start of only asking only married women to complain, not unmarried girls, so that this would not block their chances of marriage later). It took another seven years for the Commission to finally conclude, on October 16, 2011, that personnel of the 4{+t}{+h}Rajputana Rifles, 68 Mountain Brigade, had raped women of Kunan Poshpora on the night of February 23-24, 1991. It ordered the State government to pay the affected persons at least two lakh rupees each, and recommended that the criminal case be reopened and reinvestigated by a Special Investigation Team headed by an officer not below the rank of an SSP, and that the investigation be taken to its logical end in a time-bound period.

Even this did not stir the State government to move, despite a brief storm in the Assembly. Finally the MLA who represents their village, who was also the Law Minister, called a few older men from the village to meet the Chief Minister. He also distributed cash of one lakh rupees to 39 women. But the criminal case was still not reopened. Finally, a group of University students helped women of Kunan Poshpora petition the Supreme Court in March 2013, seeking implementation of the order of the State Human Rights Commission.

In June 2013, Seema Mustafa, senior journalist, invited a delegation for the Centre for Policy Analysis to visit the survivors. The team included Sehba Farooqui, AIDWA, Mohammad Salim, CPI-M, Bhalchandra, CPI, EN Rammohan, retired police officer, John Dayal, human rights activist and me. As we heard the men and women who gathered to meet us, it was evident that their wounds were unhealed, their agony unabated. It was as though the outrage occurred not 22 years earlier, but just yesterday.

Many women wept wordlessly. An old man whose aged mother was raped and who became permanently disabled by the torture he suffered that night, cried out: “When one woman was raped in Delhi, all of India lit candles in her memory for 15 days. But where is justice for us?” Young men spoke of the stigma as they grew and their classmates would ask whether their mothers or sisters were raped. Women spoke of 15 hysterectomies, the difficulties in getting their daughters wed, and the way memories of that night corroded their marriages and their lives.

Despite the orders of the High Court, the police filed another closure report before the Kupwara Sessions Court recommending the case again be closed without trial, in May 2013, claiming again that the perpetrators could not be traced. On June 10, 2013, a protest petition was filed on behalf of the survivors, alleging mala fide by the police because despite written information regarding involvement of 125 personnel of 4{+t}{+h} Rajputana Rifles, the police had not questioned them, neither was an identification parade conducted. Just days after our visit, on June 18, 2013, District Judge Geelani rejected the police recommendation for closure, and asked the police to “unravel the identity of… the perpetrators”.

“Without justice, what is the point of living?” a village headman lamented to us. “Twenty-two years have passed since that terrible night. A hundred girls and women in Kunan Poshpora were gang-raped by soldiers of the Indian army. Until today, not a single person has been punished. How can we live?”

An old man whose aged mother was raped and who became permanently disabled by the torture he suffered that night, cried out: “When one woman was raped in Delhi, all of India lit candles in her memory for 15 days. But where is justice for us?”

Copyright© 2013, The Hindu

Saturday, June 29, 2013

Modi’s Himalayan miracle

 

Abheek Barman Jun 26, 2013, 12.00AM IST

On the evening of Friday, June 21, as India reeled from the shock of the calamity in Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh, Gujarat chief minister Narendra Modi landed up in Dehradun with a handful of officers. By Sunday, it was claimed that he had rescued 15,000 stranded Gujaratis from the wreckage of Uttarakhand and sent these grateful folks back home.

This miracle was played up in media. But how was this feat achieved in a day or so, when India's entire military establishment has struggled to rescue around 40,000 people over 10 days?

Reports say that Modi pulled off this coup with a fleet of 80 Innovas. How did these cars manage to reach places like Kedarnath, across roads that have been washed away, over landslides that have wrecked most access routes?

But let us assume Modi's Innovas had wings as well as helicopter rotors. Including the driver, an Innova is designed to carry seven people. In a tough situation, assume you could pack nine passengers into each car. In that case, a convoy of 80 Innovas could ferry 720 people down the mountains to Dehradun at one go. To get 15,000 people down, the convoy would need to make 21 round trips.

The distance between Dehradun and Kedarnath is 221 km. So 21 trips up and down would mean that each Innova would have to travel nearly 9,300 km.

It takes longer to travel in the hills than in the plains. So, assuming an average speed of 40 km per hour, it would take 233 hours of driving to pull off the feat.

This assumes non-stop driving, without a second's rest to identify the Gujaratis to be rescued and keeping the rest of the distressed folk at bay, or any time to load and unload the vehicles. And forget about any downtime for the gallant rescuers.

That is nearly 10 days of miraculous work. And Modi pulled it off in a day.

Actually, in less than a day: a breathless media reported that by Saturday, 25 luxury buses had brought a group of Gujaratis back to Delhi. For some reason, four Boeing aircraft also idled in some undisclosed place nearby.

Modi, ever modest, himself did not make the claim of rescuing 15,000 Gujaratis from Himalayan disaster in a day. It was likely dumped on a gullible media by his public relations agency, an American outfit called Apco Worldwide. In 2007, Apco was hired, ostensibly to boost the Vibrant Gujarat summits, but to actually burnish Modi's image, for $25,000 a month.

He is in good company. Apco has worked for the dictator of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbaev, the governments of Malaysia and Israel and the American tobacco lobby.

For the latter, it set up front organisations to rubbish evidence which proved that tobacco causes cancer. Apco has also worked for pariah regimes like Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan and Nigerian strongman Sani Abacha.

Its powerful advisory council includes former Israeli diplomats Itamar Rabinovich and Shimon Stein, as well as Doron Bergerbest-Eilon, who was the highest ranked officer in the Israel security agency.

Apco is credited with Modi's makeover and his holographic campaigns. Before Apco, Vibrant Gujarat was a tame affair: the first three summits generated investment promi-ses between $14 billion and $150 billion. After Apco, in 2009 and 2011, these jumped to $253 billion and $450 billion.

Apco worked tirelessly to rope in investor interest from America. It also lobbied with politicians in Washington to remove the ban on Modi travelling to the US. The ban was imposed after the massacre of Muslims in Gujarat as Modi presided over the state in 2002. So far, Apco hasn't succeeded in getting Modi a US visa.

And the Vibrant Gujarat numbers are all hot air. An analysis by my colleague Kingshuk Nag in his biography of Modi shows that only 3.2% of the 2009 number has materialised on the ground. Of the 2011 figure, a mere 0.5% is for real.

But Modi does not need Apco to lie. In 2005 he announced that state-owned company GSPC had made India's biggest gas discovery: 20 trillion cubic feet (tcf) valued at more than $50 billion, off Andhra Pradesh. This was 40% more than what Reliance had found in the same area. Modi then egged on GSPC to grab projects in Egypt, Yemen and Australia.

Many suspected that Modi's gas claim was hot air, but in the absence of evidence few could say so. But by 2012, the Centre's directorate general of hydrocarbons (DGH), which analyses and certifies all energy finds, said that it could vouch for only a tenth of Modi's claim: there was only 2 tcf of gas. And that too in areas tough to exploit.

Meanwhile, under Modi's rousing leadership, GSPC had poured in nearly $2 billion into exploration, much of it raised as debt based on its supposed 20 tcf gas find. When the gas vanished, GSPC went bust.

To rescue it, Modi asked the company to venture out into more areas, like city gas distribution. There have been problems with these businesses as well, including a very dubious transaction with a company in Barbados.

In every area the Modi narrative is a tale of bluster and bluff. But his Himalayan miracle is a barefaced, cynical lie.

Still in the last row

June 29, 2013

 

Uma Kambhampati and Dr. M. Niaz Asadullah

 

LAGGING BEHIND:Educational disadvantage constrains social mobility and worsens exclusion and marginalisation.—PHOTO: S. SUBRAMANIUM

LAGGING BEHIND:Educational disadvantage constrains social mobility and worsens exclusion and marginalisation.—PHOTO: S. SUBRAMANIUM

As another election draws near and political parties machinate to secure their vote banks, perhaps some who are far-sighted enough will look to India’s young Muslims. Those under 19 years of age form over 50 per cent of the country’s 180 million Muslims, a number that is growing. Yet, whether these young Muslims can play a part in the nation’s ambition of becoming a global player or not will depend on the extent to which they benefit from the growth process and broader, social reform initiatives.

That Muslims in India are disadvantaged was set out unequivocally in the Sachar Commission report in 2006. Between 1993-4 and 2007-8, the UNDP also found that Muslim urban poverty declined only 1.7 points whereas urban poverty levels generally fell from 32.4 per cent to 14.5 per cent. More significantly, educational disparities between Muslims and others, have not been decreasing as fast as they should have.

Findings

In our research on 246,389 children from 11 States (the full text is at: http://ftp.iza.org/dp6329.pdf), we find that, overall, India has made progress in plugging the school enrolment gap between upper-caste Hindu children and other children, from 1983 to 2004. The enrolment gap between Scheduled Caste (SC) children and upper caste Hindu children declined from 17 per cent points in 1983 to one per cent point in 2004. In contrast, the enrolment gap between Hindu and Muslim children continued to persist at four per cent points in 2004. Importantly, while most States in our study show a decrease in Hindu-Muslim enrolment gaps, the gap remains significant in States like Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Bihar with large Muslim populations.

However, school enrolment is only half the story. School completion rates, which make the real difference to a child’s future show persistently larger gaps. This is not surprising because school completion takes more sustained reform. We find that for every 10 years of schooling completed by Hindu children, Muslim children only completed 8.3 years in 2004. This pattern holds good for both boys and girls. The gaps in completion rates are significant in every State in the study except Tamil Nadu.

There is a popular perception that social conservatism is the cause of the educational disadvantage among Indian Muslims. However, we find that this does not seem to be so. One important signifier is the boy-girl difference in education. We found that the education gap between boys and girls in Muslim families is smaller than in Hindu families.

Rather than conservatism, this seems to suggest a gap in public policy attention to Muslim children’s education. The gap between Muslim and SC children also suggests the same thing. Muslim children had better school completion rates than SC/ST children in 1983. However, our research shows that by 2004, when the impact of policies targeted at these groups (first articulated in the National Policy on Education in 1986 and then reiterated in the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan more recently) starts to be felt, Muslim boys had begun to lag behind SC boys in grade completion. Importantly, underlining the case that this is problem of public policy inattention rather than “culture,” the comparison of the boy-girl difference between communities remains unchanged. While more SC boys complete primary (as well as secondary) school than Muslim boys, SC girls continue to lag behind Muslim girls.

Tamil Nadu’s achievement

Tamil Nadu is the only State in our study that has successfully closed the Hindu-Muslim and gender gaps both in school enrolment and completion. It is not coincidental that respective State governments have given school education greater attention than many other States. Tamil Nadu pioneered India’s Mid-Day Meal school programme in the 1960s, three decades earlier than most States, and more recently has made a better job of operationalising the District Primary Education Project and its follow-up, the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan.

Much of the difference in Hindu-Muslim educational outcomes relates to Muslim families being poorer and larger as well as to parents within these families being less educated than those of other groups. Having said this, even when we compare children from similar economic and family backgrounds, the Muslim schooling disadvantage does not disappear. Change, it seems, can only come if future education policy initiatives explicitly target Muslim children and address the specificities of the causes of their disadvantage.

Educational disadvantage impacts the long-term prospects of any community, by constraining social mobility and worsening exclusion, marginalisation and alienation. As 13 per cent of the population, Muslims are a significant minority who can help deliver India’s future growth, if only they were given an even chance.

(Dr. Uma Kambhampati is a professor and Dr. M. Niaz Asadullah a lecturer at the University of Reading. E-mails: m.asadullah@reading.ac.uk; u.s.kambhampati@reading.ac.uk )

Muslim children continue to be marginalised in both school enrolment and completion,

says a study

Copyright© 2013, The Hindu